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ABSTRACT: Given three stylized facts about the US Coast Guard (USCG), namely, soft penalties for 
safety violations, low incidence of penalties relative to the number of violations, and substantial resources 
devoted to inspections of vessels, this paper seeks (i) a theoretical lens to view USCG activities and (ii) an 
empirical assessment of whether those activities improve performance. Harrington’s (1988) model is 
motivated by these stylized facts about US regulation in general, and provides a solution via targeting of 
good and poor performers. The model generates hypotheses about optimal regulation in the context of 
pollution prevention activities of the USCG. An organization-level panel data set consisting of thousands 
of US flag tank barges is constructed to test those hypotheses. A count model that controls for vessel 
heterogeneity yields mixed evidence. If USCG inspections are considered exogenous variables (as the 
theory presumes), they appear to prevent pollution spills. But if inspections are endogenous and respond 
to previous spills then correcting for endogeneity reverses the earlier result. In addition, violations are 
found to be good predictors of pollution occurrences, suggesting that inspections are not as effective as 
they could be. Targeting as in Harrington’s model therefore appears to be incomplete, and the findings 
suggest that more complete targeting could increase performance. An interesting finding is that stronger 
penalties could increase performance.  
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1.   Introduction 
The question of how law enforcement agencies organize their activities has attracted 
considerable attention in the economics and political science literature. Empirical studies of 
whether these agencies perform effectively, far too numerous to list, include examinations of 
police and the reduction of crime, the Environmental Protection Agency and the control of 
pollution and hazardous waste, OSHA and the enforcement of safety laws, and the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission and compliance with safety standards at reactors and nuclear power 
plants.  
A theory often invoked to study the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies is the 
principal-agent model (e.g. Shavell 1979; Holmstrom 1979). The law enforcing government 
agency seeks to minimize violations using appropriate incentives. The regulated firm or 
individual is interested in maximizing private profits, and cares less about the costs or negative 
externalities it imposes on society. Thus, a polluting firm fails to internalize the externalities it 
imposes on society if it only minimizes its private costs. In the principal-agent model the 
enforcement agency recognizes that the objective of maximizing social welfare runs counter to 
the firm’s objectives, and uses incentives in the form of penalties for noncompliance and rewards 
for compliance in order to make the firm internalize the externalities as much as possible. 
Principal-agent relationships in law enforcement are usually hierarchical relationships in which 
the regulating agency has the force of legal authority to conduct inspections and penalize.  
We consider a principal-agent model proposed by Harrington (1988) in which the 
regulating agency has the force of law behind it but is severely limited in its ability to use high-
powered incentives, such as penalties, to solve the problem. Our context is the law enforcement 
effort of the US Coast Guard (USCG), the agency charged with maintaining safe seaways and 
waterways. One of its main responsibilities is conducting safety inspections of vessels in order to 
prevent pollution incidents. What distinguishes the US Coast Guard from other law enforcement 
agencies is that it rarely uses the courts or harsh monetary penalties to enforce US maritime laws. 
In part, this is because harsh penalties would restrict commerce and raise costs to consumers.   3 
Although a system of penalties exists, for all but repeat offenders they amount to a slap on the 
wrist. It is therefore surprising that pollution incidents in US waters are not more frequent.  
The seminal empirical study of the USCG by Epple and Visscher (1984), using data from 
1970s, found that increased monitoring activity resulted in lower oil spill volume.
2 However, 
they also found that the frequency of spills increased with resources devoted to enforcement. 
Their explanation is that increased enforcement of pollution increased detection of spills that 
would otherwise be unreported. That is, enforcement is endogenous. In a subsequent study that 
emphasized optimal penalties, Cohen (1987) found that while monitoring oil transfer operations 
and random port patrols designed to detect spills were effective, routine inspections designed to 
determine if vessels were in compliance with oil spill prevention regulations had no significant 
effect on spill size. Anderson and Tally (1995) compared USCG enforcement efforts on US and 
foreign tankships and confirmed Cohen’s results. Gawande and Wheeler (1999) actually found 
routine inspections to be effective in lowering the number of oil spills aboard US flag tankships 
during the late 1980s, but did not account for possible endogeneity of hours spent on 
enforcement. Gawande and Bohara (2003) used panel data from the 1990’s and confirmed 
Cohen’s earlier conclusion about the ineffectiveness of inspections designed to check 
compliance. Other studies of enforcement and pollution, comprehensively surveyed in Cohen 
(1998), generally indicate that enforcement lowers pollution, although there is no real consensus 
about whether there is over-enforcement, that is, whether enforcement efforts pass a cost-benefit 
test. 
In this paper we investigate whether that conclusion hold for USCG inspections of tank 
barges. Barges are numerous and, though some sail ocean routes, mainly transport cargo across 
inland waterways. Typically, tank barges transfer their cargo from large ocean-sailing tankships 
that come into an ocean port. During ship-to-ship transfer of oil and chemicals spills are likely to 
occur if the personnel aboard the barges are inattentive or not well trained. Pollution incidents 
                                                           
2  The existence of the comprehensive MSMS database from which more recent studies, including this 
one, draw is in large part due to their work and recommendations.   4 
while sailing US waterways are also likely if a barge is not in peak operating condition, or if the 
barge owner/operator is negligent, or is the barge owner/operator seeks to reduce costs by using 
disposal techniques that are cheaper but not legal.  
A study of the USCG that is based on Harrington’s (1988) model, and close in spirit to 
ours, is Viladrich-Grau and Groves (1997). Viladrich-Grau and Groves examine the USCG’s 
recently implemented policy of grouping vessels into a less frequently monitored low-risk group 
and a regularly monitored high-risk group, a policy consistent with Harrington’s model. While 
they find that this policy of targeting vessels both reduces the cost of enforcement and achieves 
compliance, our results are not unambiguous. A result that stands out is our finding that 
violations aboard vessels are excellent predictors of pollution occurrences. But in a panel data set 
that represents a repeated game setting, we should not find such a result if targeting is done 
effectively according to theory.  
The results raise questions about public management issues. Might it be that the USCG 
uses a combination of governance styles to achieve its regulatory objective: hierarchical 
governance using incentives such as penalties (as postulated by the principal-agent model) and 
horizontal governance that emphasizes networking and gentle suasion? Perhaps it uses penalties 
only as a last resort, and building networks as a primary strategy. Notably, the number of 
pollution incidents, especially large spills, has declined in recent years. It is appropriate at this 
point in time to question whether styles of governance other than the command-and-control style 
implicit in the principal-agent logic of law enforcement might not work better. This paper 
examines these questions.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides relevant background information on 
USCG vessel inspections. Section 3 describes Harrington’s model and derives testable 
predictions based on the model, presuming the model represents how the USCG organizes its 
activities. Section 4 describes the data and the count data model used to study tank barge 
inspections. Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 discusses an agenda for future research that 
emphasizes public management issues. Section 7 presents our conclusions.   5 
2.   Background: US Coast Guard Inspections 
The US Coast Guard is charged with creating and regulating standards for ships in order 
to promote marine safety and environmental protection.
3 The purpose of the standards is to 
prevent human casualties and pollution occurrences, and reduce the severity of harm if such 
events do occur. The enforcement authority of the USCG is bestowed upon it by the Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA90), the Clean Water Act, the Clean Vessel Act, the Marine Plastic 
Pollution Research and Control Act, and the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships at Sea (MARPOL).  
The standards enforcement effort by the Coast Guard can broadly be defined as ex ante 
and ex post inspections. Ex post inspections investigate the causes and liability of a reported 
collision, allision, grounding, or some other accident. Ex ante inspections are scheduled for fixed 
intervals and are independent of casualties. Many ex ante inspections are periodic in order to 
certify a vessel’s seaworthiness. For example, vessels are required to come to a Coast Guard 
facility for a general audit or a comprehensive hull inspection. Non-routine inspections are 
random, follow-up or re-inspections. If a ship is found to be substantially out of compliance in 
any given type of inspection, it may be re-inspected. The penalties for non-compliance are 
surprisingly small, and are discussed below in the context of the theory. In fact, this is 
generically the case with enforcement of US regulations, and is not anomalous. The theory 
discussed in the next section provides a rationale for why this may not necessarily hinder USCG 
enforcement efforts. 
 
3.   Theory and Hypotheses 
3.1   State-independent theory (Becker, 1982): Maximal fines 
The best-known solution to the principal-agent problem of optimal fines in order to 
achieve maximum deterrence is Becker (1968). The model is ex post to the violation, and 
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presumes the violation is detected only with a probability less than one. In the context of the 
USCG, Cohen (1987) and Epple and Visscher (1984) have derived the optimal fines as follows. 
Supposing the vessel purposefully or accidentally discharges x gallons of oil, the probability it 
will be detected is p(x, m), where m is the resources expended by the USCG towards detection. 
For on-sea incidents p(x, m), while positive, is low given the detection technology and resources 
devoted to inspections. For on-shore incidents during oil transfers, the detection probability is 
higher because monitoring resources can be and are used more efficiently. If detected, the vessel 
is charged a penalty t(x).  
Suppose the damage and clean-up costs from spillage of x gallons of oil are D(x) and 
C(x), respectively. Assuming risk-neutrality on the part of the vessel owner (agent), the optimal 
penalty formula, derived by Cohen (1987), is  
 
t(x)=[D(x)+C(x)]/ p(x, 0 ) .          ( 1 )  
 
With this penalty function, the social optimum may be achieved without expending any 
resources toward detection so long as p(x,0)>0. The optimal penalty function equates the penalty, 
if the polluting vessel is detected, to environmental damage plus cleanup cost scaled by the 
probability of detection. Where the probability of detection is low, the optimal penalty, once 
detected, far exceeds the actual social cost. This is precisely when deterrence is most effective. In 
order to induce vessel owners to take the socially optimal level of care of their vessels, penalties 
increase as the probability of detection decreases, an idea that was advanced in Becker (1968).  
  However, fines in actuality are nowhere near this level. While the penalties paid as a 
result of the Exxon Valdez spill ($1 bn. toward damage and $2 bn. toward cleanup) appear to be 
in line with the optimal penalty formula, this was largely the result of negligence on the part of 
the crew captain. OPA90 applies liability limits in the event that the accident is not due to 
negligent behavior. These limits are a small fraction of the penalties paid by Exxon.    7 
  Gawande and Bohara (2003) explain the considerable resources devoted to ex ante 
inspections due to the fact that ex post penalties are large. They extend the Becker formula to ex 
ante inspections and penalties on violations found due to such inspections. Nevertheless, theirs is 
also an optimal penalty solution, and does not resolve the fact that USCG penalties are small. 
Furthermore, their theories are static and do not consider inspections as a repeated game. 
 
3.2   State-dependent theory (Harrington, 1988): Limited fines 
A collection of papers beginning with Greenberg (1984) and Landsberger and Meilijson 
(1982) has considered the moral hazard problem of regulation in the more realistic repeated 
game setting. Relaxing some assumptions to make the model more suitable to the real world 
delivers predictions that sometimes are fundamentally different from the Becker/Stigler optimal 
penalty rule. The first paper to do this in the context of regulating environmental pollution is 
Harrington (1988). In Harrington’s model the regulating agency (EPA, NRC, or USCG) is 
assumed to know the cost of compliance for each firm under its regulatory jurisdiction. It is also 
assumed that, upon monitoring a firm, the agency knows with certainty whether the firm is in 
compliance or is not in compliance. For example, inspections reveal with certainty the precise 
amount of hazardous waste emitted (in the case of the EPA), or safety violations in nuclear 
power plants (in the case of the NRC). Based on this information the agency can then determine 
whether the firm is in compliance with the law or not. If the firm is found to be non-compliant 
then the agency has a set of tools at its disposal, as described below. 
 Harrington’s model is motivated by the need to explain three stylized facts that have 
been empirically documented in the literature. These facts also apply to the USCG that is the 
subject of this study. First, the severity of penalties sanctioned by regulating agencies is low. 
Second, this occurs in the face of a considerable number of violations noted by the regulating 
agencies. Third, despite the fact of lenient penalties, many firms are actually in compliance. 
Harrington constructs a state-dependent model which makes predictions consistent with these 
three observations. The regulating agency classifies firms into two groups (states), G1 and G2,   8 
depending on their record of compliance. G1 firms are compliant firms whereas G2 firms are 
not. In order to be compliant and therefore in group G1 or move to it from G2, non-compliant 
firms must incur costs. Compliance costs are the same for all firms. Firms decide whether to 
incur such a cost or to cheat and hope that they are not inspected. If a G1 firm is inspected, it 
reveals with certainty whether the firm is compliant or not. If it is found to be non-compliant, the 
firm is moved into state G2 (and may be penalized). Firms in state G2 can only return to state G1 
if they are inspected and found to be in compliance. Their return, even if found to be compliant, 
is not certain and occurs with a probability that the agency sets. If a G2 firm is found to be non-
compliant, it may be fined. Firms make their decision based on the expected present value of that 
decision (equal to the present cost plus the present value of expected future penalties). The 
decision variables for the agency are (i) the probability of inspection of a firm being in each 
state, (ii) the penalty that agency will apply to firms in each state, and (iii) the probability with 
which a compliant G2 firm is reclassified as a G1 firm.  
  The model predicts that, depending on their compliance costs and the agency’s 
probability of inspection, firms will either (i) comply in both states whether they are G1 or G2 
firms, (ii) cheat in both states, or (iii) cheat in state G1 and comply in state G2.
4 What is the 
agency’s best policy in terms of its five decision variables, given a (low) ceiling on maximum 
allowable fine? The agency would like to achieve three objectives: minimize its resource costs 
(average inspection rate), maximize the average compliance rate, and give proper incentives to 
firms with the highest compliance cost, that is, the firms that are the least likely to comply in the 
absence of incentives. But these objectives are in conflict, and thus the agency must achieve one 
of these conditionally to a target rate of the other two. For example, if the agency seeks perfect 
compliance, then the inspection rates must be high, and the maximum fine must exceed the 
highest compliance cost. High fines make it possible, even likely, for high cost firms to not 
comply since the cost of complying exceeds the present value of future fines. In order to achieve 
                                                           
4  The surprise is that no firms will comply in state G1 and cheat in state G2, that is, the “good guys” 
cheat and the “bad guys” comply in order to go back to G1 where they get a chance to cheat.   9 
some level of compliance, then, the agency must lower the fine. Harrington finds that the agency 
trades lower fine for a higher rate of inspection. In fact, the optimal penalties are zero for firms in 
G1, and the maximum allowable (although lower than according to the Becker rule) for firms in 
G2. But since the fine for G1 firms is zero, there is incentive for G2 firms to always comply (in 
order to return to G1 and possibly cheat). As a result no fines are actually collected. In order to 
obtain the maximum compliance possible for the G2 firms, it is also necessary for the probability 
of inspection to be high for G2 firms. Harrington also shows that this state-dependent strategy 
produces a higher compliance rate with the same resources as a state-independent strategy in 
which the decision to inspect and penalize is independent of past behavior of firms (so long as 
perfect compliance, which is very expensive to achieve anyway, is not desired). 
   Thus, the ability (or desire) to levy only low penalties may not hamper regulatory 
enforcement. Low penalties for firms in state G1 combined with high frequency of inspection for 
firms in G2 (consistent with real-world observations about the general incidence of low penalties 
together with considerable resources devoted to inspections) can produce fairly high compliance 
rates (consistent with real-world findings in this regard).  
  A set of papers has sought to qualify or extend the results from Harrington’s model, 
beginning with Harford and Harrington (1991). They show that if the objective is to minimize 
control costs for a given total pollution reduction, then a state-independent approach in which the 
pollution standard used to define compliance and non-compliance is different from Harrington’s 
model works better. Raymond (1995) challenges Harrington’s conclusion that a high compliance 
rate can co-exist with low expected fines on the grounds that firms are neither identical nor are 
their compliance costs known with certainty. He shows that Harrington’s results are reversed in 
the presence of such information asymmetry and uncertainty. Intuitively, if an industry contains 
a high proportion of firms with low compliance costs then keeping the fine for this group to a 
maximum is optimal. Lowering their fine encourages even low-cost firms to become non-
compliant, with the result that the average compliance rate declines and the average inspection 
rate goes up. Therefore, setting the G1 penalties to zero is sub-optimal.    10 
Other papers bolster Harrington’s predictions. Bose (1995) shows that when inspections 
by the agency lead the agency to wrongly determine that a compliant firm is out of compliance 
(“regulatory error”) or a non-compliant firm is being compliant, then Becker’s maximum fine, 
even if it were possible to levy, is not the optimal solution. Expending monitoring resources is 
more effective than levying large fines. In fact, lower penalties and lower monitoring rates can 
induce full compliance in the presence of regulatory errors. Bose’s model works best in a 
hierarchical regulatory structure where the regulatory agency operates within a legal structure 
that has been determined by the government (for example, where laws might limit the amount of 
fines as in the case of the U.S Coast Guard). 
 An interesting extension of Harrington’s model is by Livernois and McKenna (1999), 
who introduce self-reporting by firms into the model. In this model lowering the fine for non-
compliance has two effects. The first is the conventional effect of reducing the number of firms 
that choose not to comply. The second and more interesting effect is that lowering the fine raises 
the proportion of non-compliant firms that file truthful reports about their compliance status. 
Thus, non-compliant firms identify themselves and save the agency from expending resources on 
determining non-compliance. Innes (1999) also shows that with self-reporting the government 
can costlessly impose stiffer non-reporter penalties that simultaneously increase compliance and 
reduce the agency’s enforcement effort. 
  Heyes and Rickman (1999) provide an alternative explanation for why firms will comply 
despite the small fines imposed by the regulatory agency. Their argument is that the regulatory 
agency uses tolerance in some areas that induces compliance in other areas. Tolerance is 
practiced in certain areas due to the difficult regulatory environment in those areas, where it 
would be difficult to induce compliance without expending substantial resources anyway.  For 
example, when performing safety inspection, USCG inspectors often train the crew by giving 
them valuable advice on best practices.  
Despite its seemingly restrictive assumptions, Harrington’s model is an attractive theory 
upon which to base an empirical study of the USCG for a variety of reasons. First, the low level   11 
of equilibrium penalties in the model is in line with USCG policies. Figure 1 depicts the 
empirical distribution of monetary penalties that USCG inspectors have levied on vessels during 
the period between 1986-1998. These data are from the USCG Marine Safety Management 
System (MSMS) database. Of the 3050 penalty cases, 32% have assessments of less than $100. 
These small penalties are akin to traffic tickets that can be mailed in along with evidence that the 
penalized violation has been corrected. About 92% of the penalties are at or below $1000, which 
is not an onerous fine for most vessel operators. Weber and Crew (2000) document low penalties 
for actual spillage. In 1996, 26 of the 46 enforcement jurisdictions assessed mean penalties of 
less than $3.60 per liter. Thus, small penalties appear to be the norm. Repeat violators can be 
taken to court by the USCG, but such legal cases are rare. Due to the costs involved, only 
extreme cases are penalized in this manner.
5  
Second, numerous violations are recorded by the USCG inspectors. Since Harrington’s 
model shows that even with low penalties in the face of a considerable number of violations, an 
agency is still capable of achieving a target rate of compliance in a repeated game setting, 
consistent with USCG data, we view USCG law enforcement activities through the theoretical 
lens provided by the model. The model’s assumption that is most vulnerable in the context of the 
USCG is that inspections precisely reveal whether the vessel is in compliance or not. Violations 
as a measure of compliance or non-compliance are necessarily inaccurate, even though they may 
be good predictors of oil spills.
6 This point is brought home in Gawande and Bohara (2003). In 
fact, the possibly large variance of the conditional distribution of oil spills (conditional on 
violations observed by U.S Coast Guard) discourages the use of penalties based on observed 
violations.
7 Research extending Harrington’s model along these lines would be useful. 
                                                           
5 The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA90), under which Exxon Corp. was sued for the 1989 Exxon Valdez 
spill in Alaska, perhaps provides the greatest deterrence. But even so, OPA90 limits liabilities for 
accidents in which negligence of the ship owner/operator or crew is not an issue (e.g. Gawande and 
Bohara, 2003). 
6  Further, if we assume imprecision about compliance, then individual heterogeneity across vessels 
makes it difficult to model because the predictive distribution of spills conditional upon violations varies 
across vessels. 
7  Bose’s (1995) analysis of regulatory errors and the optimal use of low fines is consistent with USCG 
policy as well.   12 
Third, circumstantial and direct evidence suggests that USCG inspections are state-
dependent. Viladrich-Grau and Groves (1997) document such a policy in effect since 1985:  
“Since 1985, the Coast Guard has followed a two-tier policy; ships entering a 
harbor are classified either as High or Low Priority vessels. A vessel is classified as High 
Priority if there has been a recent history of either: (a) a safety violation, (b) an accident, 
and (c) if it has not been inspected during the last year or monitored during the previous 
six months. The transfer operations of High Priority vessels are automatically monitored, 
whereas those of the Low Priority vessels are only infrequently monitored. LP vessels 
may be randomly selected for inspection but only if all the HP vessels that enter the 
harbor have been monitored.” (Viladrich-Grau and Groves, 1997, fn 6). 
Our conversations with numerous USCG inspectors indicate this to be the case with 
foreign-flag vessels, and to some extent with US-flag vessels. In the case of foreign-flag vessels, 
an explicit USCG-wide policy that classifies vessels according to flag and other historic vessel 
information is in effect. In the case of US-flag vessels, such a policy is implicit. Even though 
many U.S Coast Guard inspections are periodic (e.g., hull inspections, annual inspections, and 
certificate inspections), the intensity with which a vessel is inspected during these scheduled 
inspections is based on the historic behavior of the vessel owner/operator. Interviews with 
several USCG personnel indicate that vessels with significant violations in the past or with a 
record of oil spills are inspected with greater intensity than vessels with cleaner records. This is 
consistent with Harrington’s model with two states. The USCG frequently requires reinspections 
of vessels found by inspectors to have numerous violations in areas such as human safety, 
navigational equipment and maintenance. Reinspections are designed to keep firms from being 
out of compliance for too long. They therefore serve the purpose of allowing vessels to move 
from state G2 to state G1. In sum, USCG enforcement policy has many features in common with 
Harrington’s model, which makes the model appropriate to use to theoretically analyze USCG 
enforcement. 
   13 
3.3   Hypotheses 
  Harrington’s model has been empirically studied by Helland (2000) using data from the 
EPA’s Permit Compliance System database specifically for the pulp and paper industry, which is 
the largest single industrial polluter of the nation’s waterways. Quarterly data on inspections of 
paper mills by the EPA and self-reporting and violations at those mills during 1990-1993 are 
used for this study. Helland finds that these mills are noncompliant about 16% of the time. He 
finds some support for Harrington’s model. Consistent with the model, very low-cost and very 
high-cost plants do not self-report as much as do intermediate-cost firms. In Harrington’s model 
the incentives largely apply to these firms. Harrington’s model describes the plant–regulator 
interaction for that subset of paper mills that the EPA has decided to inspect for political reasons 
and at which it wishes to discourage violations actively. Thus, targeting does produce greater 
cooperation in the form of self-reporting, but such interest-driven targeting (as opposed to 
targeting based purely on past violations) does not deter violations.  
The USCG is less politically driven, and its targeting of vessels based on past vessel 
records is in line with Harrington’s model. Since greater compliance should result in a lower 
number of oil spills, Harrington’s model would imply that (even with the lower amount of 
penalties) USCG resources devoted to inspections should lower the expected number of oil spill 
incidents. That is, the model would imply that USCG policy with regard to differential 
inspections and differential (and low) penalties for vessels in the two states should be effective in 
lowering the number of oil spills. Furthermore, since USCG budget constraints do not allow an 
unlimited number of inspections, oil spills should be negatively related to resource hours devoted 
to inspections in a cross-section of vessels. This is the first hypothesis we empirically examine.  
An insightful view of this hypothesis is through the theoretical lens of the Harrington 
model. The USCG would like to achieve the twin objectives of minimizing the number of 
inspections (resource cost) and maximizing the rate of compliance. It is not possible to optimize 
both simultaneously. While it would like to achieve complete compliance, that is not possible 
with its available budget (and the implicit limit on penalties). Thus, the USCG maximizes the   14 
rate of compliance given its budget constraint on inspections resources. Since the constraint is 
binding, at the margin an additional hour of inspection resources would be effective in further 
lowering oil spills. We state this as our working hypothesis H1. 
 
H1: The number of oil spills is negatively related to the resources devoted to vessel inspections.  
 
Inspections will reveal violations and infractions aboard vessels. Based on this “state” 
information, vessels are targeted and placed in group G1 or group G2. With the appropriate 
targeting, in a repeated game, there should either be no relationship or a negative relationship 
between the number of infractions and violations found during inspections and pollution 
occurrences. This is the “enforcement leverage” hypothesis from Harrington’s model. The 
incentives are such that vessels placed in G2 are motivated to keep a cleaner record in order to 
move to G1. Hence, those vessels that are likely to pollute more often (G2-vessels) should show 
fewer violations upon inspection. Of course, once these vessels move to group G1, they have an 
incentive to reduce compliance and thus spill. In sum, the two influences should either cancel out 
or the first one should dominate since, at any point in time, there are more high-risk vessels in 
G2 than in G1 and inspections are more frequent for G2 vessels. We state this as our next 
working hypothesis. 
 
H2: The number of violations or deficiencies found during inspections is either negatively 
related to pollution occurrences, or bears no relationship to them. 
 
  Finally, the constraint on the size of penalties is real. Any relaxation of this constraint 
should lower the number of pollution incidents. We state this as the last working hypothesis.  
 
H3: Stiffer penalties reduce pollution occurrences. 
   15 
 This hypothesis can be tested with data pertaining to the number of legal cases initiated by the 
USCG inspectors on vessel owners.  
 
4.   Data and Econometric Model 
Data 
A panel of 4,896 U.S. deep-draft (over 100 gross tons of displacement) tank barges over 
the period 1986-1998 was extracted from the Marine Safety Management System (MSMS) 
database of the USCG. The fairly comprehensive MSMS database contains hours devoted to 
various types of inspections, vessel characteristics, and pollution incidents aboard these vessels. 
Count data on pollution incidents for each vessel were created from the pollution module of the 
MSMS database, and aggregating spills for vessels by year. Nearly 490 types of oil were 
recorded as being spilled into the waterways during this period.
8  
The sample has 48,524 observations and is organized as a panel of vessels for each year. 
Since there is some entry of new barges and exit of old ones, the panel is unbalanced. There were 
a total of 7,821 pollution incidents and 474 large spills involving tank barges. The highest 
number of pollution cases for any single tank barge was 22. Over 80% of the tank barges were 
involved in at least one spill during this period, and 8.12% were involved in at least one large 
spill.  
Table 1 indicates that the mean number of incidents was 0.161 (sd=0.425) in the sample. 
Conditional on the occurrence of pollution, the sample mean is 1.134 spills per tank barge. A 
significant portion of the variation in the number of pollution incidents may be the result of 
unobserved heterogeneity across vessels. The experience of the captain, the training and salary of 
the crew, the extent to which alcohol consumption is common, and the financial state of the 
                                                           
8 In order of number of occurrences over the sample period (in parentheses), the most frequently spilled 
pollutants aboard tank barges were: Fuel Oil No. 6 (738), Diesel Oil (599), Automotive Gasoline (538), 
Crude Oil (499), Fuel Oil No. 2-D (303), Fuel Oil No. 2 (272), Misc. Oil Lubricating (216), Asphalt 
(111), Other Oil (105), Cracked Gas Oil (77), Jet fuel: JP-4 (70), Solvent Naphtha (70), Oil, 
Waste/Lubricants - possible contaminant (64), Benzene (54), Jet fuel: JP-5 (52), Diesel Oil (45), Fuel Oil 
No. 4 (41), Toluene (41), Motor Oil (39), Styrene (39), Kerosene (37), Fuel Oil No. 1-D (34), Misc. Oil 
Lubricating (33).    16 
vessel operator are some examples of unobserved variables that result in the unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
Table 1 shows that the average age of tank barges is 21 years. Approximately 20% of all 
barges primarily ply ocean routes, while the rest sail on inland waterways. About 48% are 
double-sided and 45% are double-bottomed. These are sturdier designs than single-bottom and 
single-sided vessels. 
Inspection variables were based on the most recent routine inspection. Routine 
inspections are those that involve a certification inspection (COI) and/or a hull inspection. The 
average inspection lasts approximately 14 hours. Hull inspections last on average about 30 hours 
and a basic certification inspection lasts about 8 hours. The average hull inspection resulted in 
1.5 deficiencies, while the average certification inspection only resulted in 0.5 deficiencies. The 
use of legal action is rare, and only 0.2% of all inspections led to a legal case. Table 1 indicates 
that inspection hours are scaled by the size of the vessel (in thousand gross tons). This prevents 
spurious scale effects since large vessels require greater resources to inspect. The variable 
ln(InpsectionHours) is the log of the scaled inspection hours plus 1 (so when no inspection 
occurs, this variables takes the value zero). Deficiencies are defined as the number of infractions 
and safety violations found during inspections. ln(Deficiencies) is the log of one plus 
Deficiencies. 
Ship characteristics were based on the information from 1998. Where such information 
was missing, we assumed a negative answer in order to compute the data.
9 For each vessel, barge 
characteristics data was merged with inspections data for the year preceding the year of the 
pollution incident if no inspections were performed in the year of the incident (i.e. inspections 
data were lagged by a year). If inspections were performed in the same year as an incident, then 
the inspections data from the same year was used. 
                                                           
9 For example, if the question was whether a vessel was double-sided and the question was left blank, we 
could assume with some certainty that it was left blank because the answer was “no.”   
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  Unfortunately, penalty data from before 1992 cannot be matched to vessels.
10 Rather than 
lose a significant part of the sample, we decided to use the full 1986-1998 sample without the 
penalty data. We do use available information for whether the USCG initiated a legal case 
against the vessel.  
 
Econometric Model 
We model the number of pollution incidents using a count data econometric model. Count data 
models explain the variation in the count of incidents by variation in covariates, here the 
inspection hours and vessel characteristics. The count of events for observation i in the panel 
data set (i = 1, 2,…, n) is denoted yi>0. Letting xi indicate the vector of covariates for each i, with 
an associated vector of coefficients β. The conditional probability density function  () β , x y f i i  
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The exponential specification for the mean λ is popular for the ease of interpretation of the 







, or the percent change 
in the mean due to a one-unit change in the exogenous variable xj.  
A concern about the Poisson distribution is that it presumes “equidispersion” (see e.g. 
Cameron and Trivedi 1998). Specifically, the (conditional) mean equals the (conditional) 
variance,  [] [] i i i i x y V x y E | | = = exp ) ( 'β i x . It is often the case that in the data the conditional 
variance is greater than the conditional mean; that is, there is generally overdispersion.  
The more general Negative Binomial (NB) model corrects for overdispersion. 
Specifically, the conditional variance function takes the form 
 
                                                           
10 The MSMS database was integrated with the penalty database only in 1992. Previously, it existed 
separately and did not identify the penalized vessel.    18 
V[yi | xi] = λi + αλi          ( 3 )  
 
where α is a dispersion parameter. The Poisson model is the special case of the NB model where 
α = 0. Among NB models, the most tractable are the NB Type I and NB Type II models, so 
called because of the difference in their variance specifications (Type I has a linear variance 
structure, and Type II has a quadratic variance structure; see Gurmu and Trivedi 1996).  
A second problem (Gurmu and Trivedi 1996) occurs if there are multiple observations on 
the same unit, which causes temporal dependence of the data because the same unit (here a 
vessel) is being observed. The problem of temporal dependence will appear as unobserved 
heterogeneity in cross-sectional data, and a source of overdispersion. In panel count data, the 
heterogeneity associated with error that is correlated across time can be captured using a random-
effects NB model (see, e.g., Woolridge, 2002, for a discussion of random effects estimation in 
general). The NB likelihood function captures the heterogeneity from both the unobserved and 
the temporal error.
11 
Before proceeding to the model results, it is instructive to look at the data distribution. 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 depict the frequency distributions of all pollution occurrences and large 
pollution occurrences aboard tank barges over the sample period. The mode count is 1 for all 
pollution occurrences and 0 for large pollution occurrences, where “large” pollution occurrences 
                                                           
11   The likelihood function is 
() ()




























































i e = . This is the Type II NB model, where r indexes the unit of observation with errors that 
are temporally correlated, ur is the error term on rth unit-specific effect, b(ur) is the density function of ur, 
and Γ is the gamma distribution. Characteristics of the group or unit are unobservable in the data.  The 
error term, ur is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σu.  Using this specification allows the 
error term to be numerically integrated out (we use the Gaussian quadrature method) and σu to be 
estimated together with other model parameters. The integration is computationally intensive, with the 
result that each tank barge model took about 5 hours to estimate on a 1.5 Ghz Pentium. 
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were defined as incidents involving spills over 500 gallons. While arbitrary, this cutoff is useful 
in indicating the difference in the frequency distributions of potential serious incidents and 
pollution incidents generally. We note that these incidents are self-reported or detected by the 
USCG. Many pollution occurrences probably go unreported and are not in the data, thus 
understating the actual number of pollution occurrences. In the econometric analysis we take the 
data as representing the actual amount of pollution occurrences, and do not model unreported 
incidents. Figure 2.2 indicates that relatively fewer vessels were involved in large pollution 
incidents: 398 tank barges were involved in 474 large spills. Thus, the count data for large spills 
and spills generally are quite different, with the sample of large spills comprising many zeros. 
Our choice of the Negative Binomial model is appropriate given the large number of zeros and 
the potential for overdispersion in the data.
12 
 
5.   Results and Discussion 
  Table 2.1 presents NB random effects estimates from the tank barge sample consisting of 
48,524 observations over the 12-year sample period. Estimates from six models appear in the 
table. The first three models are for count data on all pollution cases while the last three models 
are for count data on large pollution cases. Consider Model 1, a baseline model in which only 
vessel characteristics and the region in which they sailed are included as explanatory variables. 
This model indicates that older vessels have more spills (this is barely statistically significant), 
tank barges that ply ocean routes have more spills, tank barges with double-sided design have 
fewer spills, and the relatively few tank barges that sail in the west region have fewer spills than 
those that sail in the east or central regions. 
The dispersion parameter α suggests that overdispersion in the dependent variable makes 
the Poisson model too restrictive. The statistical significance of α is indicative of unobserved 
                                                           
12 The descriptive statistics in Table 1 actually indicate that the sample mean for pollution counts (0.161 
for all incidents and 0.010 for large spills) are close to their variances in the sample.  It would appear that 
the Poisson distribution would thus fit.  We conducted tests of models and chose the NB model based on 
formal model comparisons of the NB versus the Poisson model.   20 
heterogeneity due to unmeasurable explanatory variables (e.g., weather conditions, crew 
experience, and the general policy of owners of the vessel regarding expenditures on 
maintenance). The statistical significance of σu (see fn 11) indicates a one-year temporal 
dependence of pollution incidents for any vessel. This result suggests that there may be multiple 
risk classes for ships and that if the USCG can identify high-risk ships, based on oil spills (that 
is, targeting based on outcomes as opposed to targeting based on safety violations), then more 
effort on those ships could be elicited, increasing performance. 
Model 2 introduces USCG interventions, measured by the logged hours of inspections on 
each vessel, the logged deficiency count found in the last inspection, and the number of legal 
actions generated during the last inspection. By presuming that inspection hours are exogenous, 
we are taking Harrington’s model quite literally. In Harrington’s model inspections occur 
randomly. The probability of inspections is endogenous, as is the targeting of vessels into groups 
G1 or G2 and the resulting penalties.
13 If Harrington’s model is correct then model 2.1 indicates 
that inspection hours are very effective in reducing pollution incidents aboard tank barges. The 
coefficients of –0.112 indicate that, all else being constant, a 10% increase in inspection hours 
decreases the expected number of pollution incidents by 1.12%. This is a strong affirmation of 
Hypothesis H1, and therefore a validation of Harrington’s model. With low penalties, an 
excessive burden is placed on inspection resources, and with budget constraints the “shadow 
price” of an additional inspection hour on the margin is the reduction in pollution incidents 
foregone.  
The positive coefficient on ln(Deficiencies) is a troubling indicator that the deficiencies 
found aboard vessels are good predictors of pollution incidents. If targeting of vessels into the 
two groups is done based on deficiencies, then we should not find a positive estimate over the 
long run on ln(Deficiencies). We not only find this in this model, but it persists across all models 
                                                           
13 Recall that the agency’s decision variables are (i) the probability of inspection of a firm being in each 
state, (ii) the penalty that agency will apply to firms in each state, and (iii) the probability with which a 
compliant G2 firm is reclassified as a G1 firm.  Inspection resources are not a decision variable, and are 
fixed exogenously.     21 
in Table 2.1 Thus, hypothesis H2 is not validated empirically. This reveals that targeting as in 
Harrington’s model is incompletely done and is not effective; in the presence of incomplete 
targeting, penalties for violations and spills are inadequate. Done effectively, targeting should 
lead to no particular relationship between deficiencies and pollution incidents, especially in the 
repeated game setting that the long panel captures. The number of legal actions brought against 
repeat violators is not statistically significantly different from 0 in Model 2. We will see that 
legal action is quite effective in deterring large spills, and probably used for that reason rather 
than for deterring pollution incidents generally. 
  Model 3 introduces two other variables. Those variables are the logged number of years 
since the last inspection and its square. The coefficients on these two variables indicate a U-
shaped relationship of pollution counts with this variable, with the minimum occurring at 1.75 
years. That is, if the last inspection occurred more than 1.75 years ago, the expected number of 
pollution incidents increases at an increasing rate. Since the mean for ln(LastInspection) is 1.5 
years (the exponential of 0.391, the mean of ln(LastInspection) in Table 1) and a standard 
deviation of 1.625 years, quite a large number of vessels are inspected at long intervals. For 
these, the expected number of spills is higher and increases as more time passes without an 
inspection. Working just from the data, it is difficult to determine if the vessels that are inspected 
over longer intervals are Harrington’s type G1 vessels. If this is so, then this result is quite 
consistent with Harrington’s model: the incentives are present for G1 vessels to pollute. 
The last three models in Table 2.1 model large pollution incidents. Strikingly, a number 
of results about pollution incidents remain valid for large pollution incidents. Model 5 shows that 
inspection hours continue to deter large pollution incidents, if, as in Harrington’s model, we 
presume inspection hours to be exogenous. The coefficient of –0.169 indicates that a 10% 
increase in inspection hours lowers the expected number of pollution incidents by 1.69%. A 
simple cost-benefit analysis shows that if the marginal hour deters sizable spills, it is worth 
increasing the number of inspection hours to deter them. The sample mean for 
ln(InspectionHours) is 13 hours. A 10% increase (1.3 hours) lowers the expected number of   22 
pollution incidents by approximately 0.0037 spills with a 95% probability (1.69% of 
0.01+2×.0.102). Since 1.3 hours cost approximately $65, if a spill costs $10 per gallon to clean 
up (this varies considerably depending on the type of ecology, environment and shoreline 
impacted), it is worth expending the marginal hour if a large spill is defined as being over 1,756 
gallons.  
Less easily explained is the large positive coefficient of 0.241 on ln(Deficiencies). USCG 
inspectors do an admirable job of discovering the number of deficiencies in “high-risk” vessels 
that are likely to be involved in large pollution cases. In fact, for every 10% increase in the 
number of deficiencies, the expected number of large spills increases by 2.4%. The number of 
deficiencies discovered aboard a vessel are an excellent predictor of large spills. What is 
surprising is that they appear to be good predictors in the panel data. If targeting as in 
Harrington’s model is done effectively, then we should not see such a result. High-risk vessels 
placed in Group 2 should have the incentives to show few violations in order to move to Group 
1, not more violations as the results show. Thus, targeting seems to be incomplete, or penalties 
(including legal cases) are so low that effective targeting is difficult to accomplish because 
accepting the penalties is cheaper than incurring the costs to remedy violations. In sum, this 
result leads to a strong rejection of hypothesis H2. 
A new result in Models 5 and 6 is that legal actions deter large pollution incidents, in line 
with hypothesis H3. In terms of the theory, the binding constraint on monetary penalties is 
relaxed by introducing a new kind of penalty, and this should do precisely what the results 
indicate. The coefficient of –5.221 in Model 5 indicates that as legal actions increase by 10% 
large pollution incidents decrease by 52%. As Table 1 indicates, legal actions are rarely used, 
probably because they are expensive for the USCG to see through to the end. The results indicate 
that they are selectively used to elicit the greatest effect, as predicted in hypothesis H3. Whether 
the lack of stiff penalties should be made up by more legal actions requires a cost-benefit 
analysis for which we do not have the cost data.    23 
Other than cost considerations, from a public management point of view the U.S Coast 
Guard resorts to legal actions only as a last resort. The Coast Guard governance style mixes 
hierarchical governance, where inspectors enforce laws using incentives such as penalties, and 
horizontal governance where gentle suasion and networking with vessel owners, operators, and 
crew are used to improve performance.  
While inspection hours are exogenous in Harrington’s model, it may not necessarily be 
true in the data. That is, USCG inspection hours may “chase” the number of pollution incidents. 
If inspection hours increase in response to past pollution incidents, and pollution incidents are 
temporarily correlated for each vessel, then inspection hours are not exogenous in the data. In 
Table 2.2, we thus instrument inspection hours using, in addition to all other exogenous variables 
in the model, these inspection-specific instruments: Certification, Hull, Trend, and WDCOI. The 
first two are dummy variables for whether hours were spent on a COI (certification) inspection 
or a hull inspection. The trend is simply the year of inspection, and WDCOI is a dummy for 
whether the vessel’s COI was withdrawn after the inspection.  
The first stage regressions in Table A1 indicate that the instruments perform admirably. 
Hours certainly vary according to the type of inspection; the trend takes care of the fact that there 
may be increases or decreases to USCG budget. WDCOI is borderline significant.  
The effect of instrumenting inspection hours on the model results is dramatic. Table 2.2 
indicates that in all models the signs for ln(InspectionHours) have reversed. Inspection hours are 
not effective in deterring either large pollution cases or pollution cases generally. Even though in 
Model 5′ the instrumented inspection hours are statistically insignificant, Model 6′ is preferred 
over this model in terms of any formal model comparison criteria. Thus hypothesis H1 is rejected 
by the data. Effectively, when ln(InspectionHours) is endogenous, USCG resources devoted to 
detecting violations does not deter large spills or spills generally. This corroborates a similar 
finding by Cohen (1987) using data from 15-20 years earlier. Thus, it appears that there are 
aspects of USCG enforcement that have remained unchanged over the years.   24 
The first-stage estimates in Table A1 indicate two possible reasons why this is so. The 
first is that since the number of deficiencies is strongly positively correlated with the number of 
hours, and also highly positively correlated with the number of pollution incidents, the 
instrumented ln(InspectionHours) is positively correlated with the number of incidents. The 
second is that the large standardized estimates (not reported) on Hull indicate that the majority of 
hours (even after scaling by gross tonnage) are spent on labor-intensive hull inspections. If hull 
inspections do not deter large or small pollution incidents, then we will get the observed result. It 
would be hard to convince the USCG to lower the number of resources devoted to hull hours. In 
our interviews with several USCG personnel, they have indicated that hull inspections deserve 
greater intensity, since damage to the hull during transit will almost surely result in an extremely 
large spill, possibly an event of national significance. Their risk-aversion to extremely large 
spills makes USCG inspectors reluctant to decrease the amount of resources spent on hull 
inspections.  
We sum up as follows. As Viladrich-Grau and Groves (1997) document, the USCG 
follows a two-tiered targeting strategy. But while they find that this works aboard tank ships and 
tank barges, we find that targeting is incomplete. Even if hours are held to be exogenous as in 
Harrington’s model, there remains the troubling finding that deficiencies are positively correlated 
with spills. This should not be the case if targeting is done effectively in a repeated game setting. 
Thus, hypothesis H2 is overwhelmingly rejected by the data. If hours are endogenous, this 
violates Harrington’s model assumption. Now, inspection hours are used to target vessels, rather 
than violations found in random inspections. Thus violations predict spills well, and so do 
inspection hours. This is similar to the original finding of Epple and Visscher. But hours and 
violations are good predictors of spills; appropriate actions should be taken to prevent those 
spills. We speculate that, as stated in hypothesis H3, if fines were stiffer, they would provide the 
required deterrence. Perhaps then we would not find the positive coefficients on 
ln(InspectionHours) and ln(Deficiencies). We actually find that legal cases can be used 
effectively to deter large spills, thus providing empirical support for hypothesis H3. A case for   25 
stiffer fines is made in Weber and Crew (2000) who find the small size of fines wanting. They 
also find that stiffer fines, without being unduly harsh, could lower spills aboard barges. 
According to their results, a 10-day improvement in the speed with which penalties are assessed 
should reduce the volume of oil spillage by 0.6%. Of course, increases in the severity of 
punishment can reduce spillage even further. 
  The difference between our results and those of Viladrich-Grau and Groves may be due 
to data differences as well as model differences. Our panel data captures elements of a repeated 
game. Our data is from the post-OPA90 period, when a regime change may have occurred, while 
Viladrich-Grau and Groves use data from the 1980s. Finally, we introduce the number of 
deficiencies in our econometric model, which is missing from Viladrich-Grau and Groves’ study. 
Furthermore, they find that penalties do not matter on the margin, whereas our results (about 
legal cases) and those of Weber and Crew (2000) find that they do. The application of Viladrich-
Grau and Groves’ method to the panel data would certainly be revealing, and we leave that as an 
open research issue. 
 
6.  Public Management Issues 
Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2001) define public sector governance broadly as “regimes of 
laws, rules, judicial decisions, and administrative practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable 
the provision of publicly supported goods and services through formal and informal relationships 
with agents in the public and private sectors.” Governance thus involves any constitutionally 
legitimate means, both vertical and horizontal, for achieving direction, control, and coordination 
of individuals or organizations (Hill and Lynn, 2004).  
This is very much a model of hierarchical (vertical) governance, in which the principal-
agent relationship between the USCG as a law enforcement agency is solved using high-powered 
incentives (penalties). The motivation for using this model is succinctly stated by Hill and Lynn 
(2004):    26 
“the causal logic of governance is complex and difficult to study, yet that 
is the intellectual challenge facing the governance research community: producing 
the kind of ‛strong causal insights’ that have a plausible claim to validity in 
various contexts.”  
 
The hierarchical model we use, due to Harrington (1988), delivers causal insights and 
produces testable hypotheses that are valid in a variety of law enforcement contexts. In the real-
world environment of limited penalties and budget constraints, state-dependent targeting is used 
in order to economize on both the use of high-powered incentives as well as resources devoted to 
monitoring and inspections.  
However, this approach neglects other types of horizontal governance methods that the 
USCG may well use in combination with hierarchical methods in order to improve performance 
(i.e., reduce pollution occurrences). Kettl (2002) notes that transformations in governance have 
“made government both horizontal – in search of service coordination and integration with 
nongovernmental partners in service provision – and vertical – through both traditional, 
hierarchical bureaucracies and multi-layered federalism.” Scholz (1991) advances the notion of 
cooperative regulatory enforcement as a way to increase performance, a message that has been 
echoed in the context of environmental regulation by Fiorino (1999, 2001) Potoski and Prakash 
(2004), and Steinzor (1998). 
Indeed, the USCG may be employing a more cooperative approach in terms of the actual 
interactions their inspectors have with vessel owners and operators. For example, while 
examining safety violations, experienced inspectors may tutor and exemplify the “right” way to 
maintain safety. A more cooperative approach may send the signal that even though they are 
ultimately law enforcers and it is their job to inspect and correct violations, they are willing to 
forgive violations if they are not repeated with regularity. Thus, penalties are forgiven. In turn, 
vessel owners respond by their own signals about having done the best they can to remedy 
violations but only to the extent that is financially feasible for them. In this way, a horizontal   27 
system of governance co-exists with a vertical one. While in this example one does not 
necessarily enhance the other, a deeper examination of horizontal governance as practiced by the 
USCG is relevant and would be revealing. In closing, we outline a research program along these 
lines.  
The theory for such a program should borrow from the game theory literature on the 
evolution of cooperation. Applications to networking in the field of industrial organization are 
plentiful. The methodology for such a program would require an internal survey of USCG 
personnel with experience in inspections of vessels at various port safety offices, so as to capture 
the heterogeneity of their experiences.  
A survey instrument would also shed light on the major question of how public 
management affects governance. The effect of public management on governance subsumes the 
previous question about whether governance is comprised of horizontal networks as well as 
hierarchical relationships. In their meta analysis of governance studies, Hill and Lynn (2004) 
indicate three elements of public management that influence governance. These elemental 
sources of performance improvements or declines are Administrative Structures, Tools, and 
Values and Strategies (Hill and Lynn, Table 6).  
The 1990s, during which, in response to the newly passed Oil Pollution Act on the heels 
of the Exxon Valdez incident, the USCG drastically changed its policies to respond to the new 
laws and initiatives, provides a natural experiment. This regime change can be used to assess not 
only the source of changes in governance, but also its differential impact on performance. It is 
clear that since OPA90 there have been far fewer spills than in earlier periods. It has been 15 
years since a large spill like the Valdez incident took place is US waters. USCG’s organizational 
change in terms of these three elements of their management should be measured, and their 
effectiveness sourced to them.  
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7.   Conclusion 
This paper constructs an organization-level database on monitoring and pollution 
incidents for the U.S Coast Guard (USCG). The database informs a theory-based investigation of 
the effectiveness of law enforcement when the use of high-powered incentives such as penalties 
is very limited. The theoretical context in which USCG enforcement is placed is Harrington’s 
model of targeting. In this model, vessels are put into two groups for which there is differential 
monitoring and (limited) penalties. If USCG enforcement is in line with the theory, then data on 
inspections and performance can be used to test three hypotheses generated from the theory. The 
first hypothesis is that USCG resources spent on inspections are effective in curtailing pollution 
occurrences. The second is that there should be no relationship between infractions and safety 
violations detected during inspection and pollution occurrences. Third, if the limit on the 
penalties is relaxed, or complementary penalties can be imposed, these will deter pollution 
occurrences. 
We assemble a panel data set for about 4,500 tank barges over the period 1986-1998. A 
Negative Binomial panel econometric model is used to explain count data on the number of 
pollution occurrences aboard these vessels using variables that measure USCG enforcement 
effort and vessel characteristics. The findings about the hypotheses are mixed. We reject the first 
and second hypotheses and fail to reject the third. It appears that U.S Coast Guard inspections do 
not target completely in accordance with Harrington’s model. Thus, noncompliance by vessels is 
not fully deterred in the presence of limited penalties.  
On the other hand, the model we have investigated is a hierarchical command-and-
control model of governance. In the public administration literature there have been calls for 
mixing hierarchically-based governance together with an approach that emphasizes networking 
and two-sided cooperation, termed horizontal governance. A future line of research inquiry 
should conduct a theory-based investigation into whether these two modes of governance in 
combination are more effective than they are alone.  
   29 
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 Figure 1: Distribution of USCG-imposed harm-based Penalties












0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000




















yTable 1:  Variable description and descriptive statistics 
   Mean sd 
#Pollution  Count of pollution cases per year.   0.161  0.425 
#LargePollution  Count of large pollution cases (>500 gallons/pounds) per year.   0.010  0.102 
ln(InspectionHours)  Natural log of (total inspection hours from last inspection divided 
by (registered gross tonnage divide by 1000)).  2.245 0.850 
ln(LastInspection)  Natural log of the number years since the last inspection.  0.391  0.486 
ln(Deficiencies)  Natural log of the deficiency count of the last inspection  0.247  0.535 
#LegalAction  Count of legal actions generated during last inspection.  0.002  0.040 
Age  (Calendar year of ship minus build year ) divided by 100.   0.216  0.119 
OceanRoute  Dummy variable, 1 = vessel's primary route is ocean.  0.081  0.273 
DoubleSided  Dummy variable, 1 = vessel is double-sided.   0.542  0.498 
DoubleBottomed  Dummy variable, 1 = vessel is double-bottomed.  0.507  0.500 
East  Dummy variable, 1 = last inspection occurred in eastern U.S.  0.411  0.492 
West  Dummy variable, 1 = last inspection occurred in western U.S.  0.047  0.211 
Central  Dummy variable, 1 = last inspection occurred in central U.S.  0.518  0.500 
NonSiteSpecific  Dummy variable, 1 = last inspection by non-site specific USCG 
group or outside US  0.024 0.153 
Tonnage  Registered gross tonnage of barge.  1355.5  1878.5 
Certification  The inspection was for a certificate of inspection.  0.561  0.557 
Hull  The inspection was for a hull inspection.  0.226  0.437 
Trend  Observation year minus 1986 (beginning observation year)  6.839  3.332 
WDCOI  USCG withdrew the vessel's Certificate of inspection.  0.001  0.029 
Notes: 
1.  All variables are constructed from the US Coast Guard MSMS database over the 1986-1998 period. 
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Table 2.1: Random Effects Estimates from Negative Binomial model 
Harrington Model: Inspection Hours Exogenous 
 
 
  All pollution cases  Large Pollution Cases 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
−1.835***  −1.595***  −1.542***  −4.869*** −4.502***  −4.380***  Intercept 
(−47.87) (−31.26) (−29.34) (−29.91) (−20.91) (−20.46) 
−0.112***  −0.108***  −0.169***  −0.167***  ln(InspectionHours)  −  (−7.497) (−7.214)  −  (−2.950) (−2.876) 
−0.382***  −0.253  ln(LastInspection)  −  −  (−7.603)  −  −  (−0.623) 
0.340***  −0.492  [ln(LastInspection)]
2  −  −  (11.57)  −  −  (−1.097) 
0.043** 0.035  0.241***  0.252***  ln(Deficiencies)  −  (1.968) (1.599)  −  (3.169) (3.331) 
0.193** 0.216  −5.221***  −4.368***  #LegalAction  −  (0.763) (0.854)  −  (−23.75) (−20.14) 
0.197* 0.223*  −0.037  −0.675*  −0.632  −0.087  Age  (1.824) (1.929)  (−0.302) (−1.650) (−1.510) (−0.204) 
0.492*** 0.426*** 0.434***  1.101***  0.913*** 0.889***  OceanRoute  (9.668) (9.372) (9.292)  (8.389)  (6.777) (6.640) 
−0.218***  −0.234***  −0.231***  −0.320  −0.343  −0.345  DoubleSided  (−4.342) (−4.267) (−4.128) (−1.514) (−1.631) (−1.640) 
−0.062  −0.058  −0.063  −0.651*** −0.632***  −0.620***  Double-bottomed  (−1.235) (−1.048) (−1.121) (−2.999) (−2.936) (−2.877) 
0.014 0.028 0.021  0.261**  0.261**  0.272***  East  (0.512) (1.092) (0.799)  (2.456)  (2.458) (2.577) 
−0.245***  −0.230***  −0.221***  −0.498**  −0.484**  −0.463**  West  (−3.936) (−3.589) (−3.390) (−2.134) (−2.082) (−2.017) 
0.312*** 0.316*** 0.254***  1.176** 1.268**  1.365**  α (NB dispersion 
parameter)  (7.318) (6.693) (6.126)  (1.986)  (2.082) (2.118) 
0.358*** 0.343*** 0.387***  1.031***  0.974*** 0.920***  σu (random-effects  
parameter)  (13.30) (19.01) (22.21)  (11.41)  (10.25) (9.252) 
N  48,524 48,524 48,524  48,524  48,524 48,524 
# parameters  9  12  14  9  12  14 
Log-Likelihood  −22409.9    −22380.0    −22306.1    −2543.0    −2533.7    −2511.9   
Notes: 
1.  Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedastic-consistent t-statistics 





Table 2.2: Random Effects Estimates from Negative Binomial model 
Inspection Hours Endogenous and Instrumented 
 
 
  All pollution cases  Large Pollution Cases 
Variable Model  2′ Model  3′ Model  5′ Model  6′ 
−2.469***  −2.496***  −5.005***  −5.945***  Intercept 
(−18.70) (−19.82) (−9.217) (−13.16) 
0.290***  0.333*** 0.039 0.533***  ln(InspectionHours)  (5.c138) (6.086)  (0.161)  (2.740) 
−0.190*** 0.047  ln(LastInspection)  −  (−3.188)  −  (0.110) 
−0.013  −1.050**  [ln(LastInspection)]
2  −  (−0.194)  −  (−2.088) 
0.002 0.125***  0.224***  0.395***  ln(Deficiencies)  (0.086) (4.470) (2.778) (4.102) 
0.128 0.151  −0.755***  −0.904***  #LegalAction  (0.533) (0.615)  (−3.521) (−4.260) 
0.088  −0.170  −0.638  −0.284  Age  (0.805) (−1.432) (−1.532) (−0.669) 
0.611*** 0.637*** 1.022*** 1.231***  OceanRoute  (10.55) (11.07)  (5.79)  (7.85) 
−0.174***  −0.165***  −0.334  −0.229  DoubleSided  (−3.441) (−3.192) (−1.539) (−1.072) 
−0.071  −0.077  −0.617***  −0.655***  Double-bottomed  (−1.445) (−1.526) (−2.811) (−3.019) 
−0.032  −0.045 0.238**  0.168  East  (−1.157) (−1.590) (2.144)  (1.552) 
−0.294***  −0.290***  −0.515**  −0.599**  West  (−4.700) (−4.568) (−2.165) (−2.530) 
0.314*** 0.251***  1.181**  0.964*  α (NB dispersion  
parameter)  (6.799) (6.128) (2.207) (1.821) 
0.354*** 0.395*** 1.016*** 0.977***  σu (random-effects  
parameter)  (12.90) (15.60) (11.07) (10.47) 
N  48,524 48,524 48,524 48,524 
#  parameters  12 14 12 14 
Log-Likelihood  −22396.1  −22313.3  −2538.2  −2512.6 
 
      See Notes to Table 2.1  
 
Table A1: First Stage (OLS) Estimates  
Dependent Variable:  ln(InspectionHours) 
 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2 
2.055*** 1.657***  Intercept 
(145.422) (70.407) 
0.110*** 0.104***  ln(Deficiencies) 
(15.46) (14.64) 





0.091 0.111  #LegalAction 
(0.978) (1.203) 
0.353*** 0.300***  Age 
(10.31) (8.641) 
−0.540***  −0.537***  OceanRoute 
(−35.84) (−35.82) 
−0.144***  −0.143***  DoubleSided 
(−9.183) (−9.205) 
0.030* 0.031**  DoubleBottomed 
(1.912) (2.021) 
0.164*** 0.166***  East 
(21.32) (21.66) 
0.139*** 0.145***  West 
(7.304) (7.675) 
−0.110*** 0.262***  Certification 
(−15.56) (13.92) 
0.468*** 0.468***  Hull 
(51.93) (52.19) 
0.010*** 0.009***  Trend 
(9.089) (8.151) 
0.398*** 0.230*  WDCOI 
(3.094) (1.798) 
N  48524    48524   
# Parameters  13  15 
R
2 0.096  0.087 
Adjusted R
2 0.095  0.087 
 
 